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On Beauty
Gernot Böhme
abstract  Beauty was once the main or even exclusive topic of aesthetics. 
Now, two hundred years after Karl Rosenkranz’s Aesthetics of Ugliness and a 
formidable development of fine arts in which many atmospheres beyond the 
edge of beauty were produced, it may be time again to ask the fundamental 
question of what the beautiful is like. But putting this question we notice that 
since the 18th century our aesthetical experience has deeply changed, so that 
the concept of traditional beauty must be changed itself.
keywords  Beauty, aesthetic experience
I. The riddle of beauty
That we are touched by beauty is beyond doubt. Everyone has such ex-
periences, and knows that they cover a wide spectrum. They extend from 
deep shock, through amazed perception of something wholly other, to 
a momentary lifting of our spirits. They extend from a feeling of pain-
ful longing, through fascination with the wholly other, to a sense of be-
ing enveloped and sheltered in delightful well-being. Yet if we are called 
upon to say what beauty is, we find ourselves at a loss. Indeed, we are 
afraid that by naming beauty we may turn it into something other than 
what we have experienced. “We cannot possibly be inclined to compre-
hend in the form of a definition something which must be understood 
in a fundamentally different way, something which we have ourselves 
experienced and loved quite differently; for such a definition can easily 
make it something alien and different.”1 With this assertion the philos-
opher and religious thinker Søren Kierkegaard introduces the concepts 
of “existence.” These are concepts with which matters become serious, 
because the content of the concept is intimately bound up with the per-
son who thinks it, or, conversely, because the subject is involved in the 
content of his or her thought. Perhaps we have already discovered here 
a first characteristic of beauty. Beauty cannot be completely objectified; 
beauty is not a property which a person, a thing or a scene simply has, 
because the involvement of the participating subject is always intrinsic 
to it. We cannot pin down the beauty of a scene just because our delight 
is an intrinsic part of that scene. One might leave the matter there and 
say: One cannot speak of beauty, one has to experience it.
But one does not leave the matter there. On the contrary, since the an-
cient Greeks there have constantly been attempts to determine what 
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beauty is,2 and in philosophy a whole discipline has emerged which is 
primarily concerned with this question, namely aesthetics. Up to the mid-
nineteenth century aesthetics was a theory of beauty. It might also have 
been called a theory of the fine arts, since up to about that time the essen-
tial demand placed on the work of art was that what it represented had to 
appear beautiful. A hint of this view still persists in our everyday notions, 
as when we say of a thing or a situation that it is aesthetically pleasing, by 
which we mean that it is beautiful; or when we speak of the aestheticising 
of the real, referring to attempts to beautify reality. It was only after Hegel 
that something like an aesthetic of ugliness3 could emerge, and, as we know, 
since then art has moved very far from having to be beautiful as such. And 
yet it is precisely this aspect, this way of gaining access to the beautiful, by 
way of art, design or architecture, which is a further reason for attempting 
to determine what beauty is. For although the experience of beauty may 
be, for the recipient, so subjective, indeed so intimate that one cannot hope 
to elucidate it verbally in its ultimate nature, the matter looks quite differ-
ent from another direction, when viewed from the standpoint of produc-
tion aesthetics. It is, of course, the aim of the artist, the designer, the archi-
tect, to create by means of the object the conditions in which people are 
able to experience beauty – by establishing vistas, by shaping objects, by 
arranging scenes. This implies two things. Firstly, that the experience of 
beauty cannot be as subjective as it first appears to the person affected by 
it. If the productive effort to create beauty is to have any meaning at all, 
then it must be supposed that our experiences of beauty are, at least to a 
certain extent, shared. The paradigm here is once again – as in the aesthet-
ics of atmospheres generally4 – the art of the stage set. That art would be 
pointless if it could not be assumed that a given audience would experi-
ence in the same way an arrangement with which an atmosphere is created 
on the stage. It is the same with beauty: the artist, the designer, the archi-
tect will want to know what he or she has to do to ensure that a public will 
experience his or her objects or arrangements as beautiful. And to say 
what the artist has to do would be the task of aesthetics.
And yet, has it been said? Have we got a definition of beauty? Or must 
it constantly be defined anew, because people’s taste changes, or per-
haps – and this goes deeper – because people’s manner of experiencing 
changes?
2. The classical answers
Just as the art and architecture of the ancient Greeks have been the domi-
nant influences over the longest period of European cultural history, so too 
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have their views on beauty. At the beginning of any aesthetic theory stands 
Plato with this thesis that beauty was that which shines forth most strongly 
(το εκφανεστατον).5 This definition has something in its favour even to-
day. It seems to locate the beautiful in the sphere of the visible. It brings 
it together with the experience of light, and although it defines beauty 
very clearly as a characteristic of objects, it nevertheless, by using the term 
“shine” (φαινεσθαι), establishes a relationship to the subject: if something 
appears (φαινεθαι), it must do so for someone. Yet this first impression is 
deceptive; in it we read Plato’s definition too quickly, in terms of our own 
needs. First of all, it must be remembered that for Plato true being, which 
also means true beauty, lies in the Forms (or Ideas), that is, not in the things 
of the sensuous world but in the original models existing in eternity, which, 
as such, can only be thought. The things in the world are beautiful only in 
so far as the Forms are brought clearly to expression through them. This 
makes clear at the same time what the reference to “that which shines forth 
most strongly” actually means. Just as the eternal things, the Forms, are 
beautiful in being simply what they are, the transient things of our world 
are beautiful in making clearly visible the Form to which they correspond. 
A bed is beautiful by being a good bed, and as such recognisable. Something 
is beautiful if it is what it is really well, and as such is knowable. In this way, 
beauty becomes identified with a kind of radiant precision.
This view has a certain fascination, and one would like to follow it if 
one could. But it is clearly based on presuppositions which we no longer 
share. Plato’s conception of the beautiful places the beauty of something 
– of things, but also of people – in relationship to what they truly are. 
Beauty, therefore, is in no way something external, a veneer. It is not mere 
appearance, but is bound up with being-good. In the background of this 
idea is the conception, shared by all Greeks, of the unity of the beautiful 
and the good, of the kalonkagaton. Thus the good citizens are those held 
in esteem, and as esteemed citizens they are also beautiful. The beautiful 
are the aristocrats, who are distinguished by their proficiency, which sets 
them apart from the mass. Just as being beautiful is not something exter-
nal to things or people, likewise being-good is not something which has 
its effect in seclusion. Inconspicuous goodness was a notion alien to the 
Greeks. What is good – such was their conviction – also reveals itself as 
such. It is radiant, it stands out. Socrates, in the Platonic dialogue Hippias 
Major, brings both ideas together very beautifully when the question is 
raised whether a household mixing implement, a “quirl,” made of gold is 
more beautiful than one made of olive wood. For Socrates the matter is 
clear. The quirl made of gold may be lustrous, but it is difficult to handle 
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and does not harmonise with the taste of the gruel it is supposed to stir. 
Therefore the olive wood quirl is more beautiful, and that is seen both in 
using it and in the taste of the gruel produced with it. Goodness stands 
out, and the better a quirl is, the more precise and radiant it is, and there-
fore the more beautiful.6
The linking of being-beautiful and being-good in Plato has far-reaching 
consequences. It is already clear in his own work that, according to his 
definition of beauty, mathematical objects and, more precisely, geometri-
cal ones, are the most beautiful. For nothing is as good, as precisely what 
it is, as a mathematical object: a sphere, a tetrahedron, a cube, a square, an 
equilateral triangle. Beauty thus becomes regularity, harmony, proportion-
ality. The consequence – disastrous from a present-day standpoint – is that 
attempts have been made on this basis to decipher the secret of beauty in 
other spheres: simple numerical relationships, the Golden Section, arith-
metic and geometric means, the Fibonacci series, have been used to ex-
plain what could cause us to experience something as beautiful.7 And there 
is indeed something satisfying in noting that the seed head of a sunflower 
or the convolutions of a snail’s shell obey certain mathematical laws, and 
even in fractal formations such as the Appelman (Mandelbrot-Set in chaos 
theory) – which, though confusing, impress us as beautiful – structures of 
self-similarity can be found. The idea of beauty through proportionality 
has also proved itself in practice. The impression of measure and bal-
ance, the graceful beauty of classical buildings from Roman antiquity up 
to neoclassi cism, is based on confidence in the theory of proportion of 
Vitruvius. This theory, however, apart from recommending that the di-
mensions and parts of a building be determined by a basic measure and 
the whole be thus made proportional, also has the peculiarity that the basic 
measure is the human being itself. It therefore contains the subjective mo-
ment which seems to us to be necessary for the experience of beauty: in 
a Vitruvian building human beings can set themselves in relation to the 
whole because their own bodies are the measure of that whole.
The aesthetic theory of Immanuel Kant marked a decisive turning-
point in thinking about beauty. And yet even his thought was dominated 
by the basic idea that true beauty is located in forms, which was to play 
a leading role right up to the twentieth century. In Kant the debate on 
whether line or colour was more important, a debate which, of course, 
took place in relation to painting, was in reality decided in advance, since 
he only knew the paintings which were regarded as models in his time 
in the form of steel engravings. He intensified this antithesis by connect-
ing it to the difference between the pleasing and the beautiful. Colours 
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are, at most, pleasing, whereas beauty depends on form, and therefore, 
in paintings, on line. Accordingly, he said of music that it is “enjoyment 
rather than cultivation,”8 since the pleasure afforded by music is based 
on the associations it arouses. “But in the charm and mental movement 
produced by music, mathematics has certainly not the slightest share.”9 
With Plato music has been a paradigm of beauty precisely because of its 
mathematical character. Even before him, Pythagoras had represented 
the octave by the ratio 2:1, the fifth by the ratio 3:2 and the fourth by 
the ratio 4:3. But between Plato and Kant stands the astronomer Kepler, 
who had stated that everyone needed to have a mathematician deep in 
their soul in order to take pleasure in music.10 Kant no longer wanted to 
believe in such a mathematician, who, in listening to music, perceived its 
harmonic proportions. For him, therefore, beauty was no longer a matter 
of cognition, of perfected form, but rather a matter of the arousal of hu-
man emotions in the search for form.
This difference does in fact constitute a decisive turning-point in 
thinking about beauty. It meant that emotional, affective participation 
in beauty was taken seriously. The beautiful, Kant rightly observes, sets 
the forces of feeling in motion. It is uplifting. For Kant, objects such as 
the Platonic bodies, cubes, tetrahedrons, octahedrons, spheres, etc., were 
not beautiful. They were perfect; they corresponded to their concept and 
for that reason could be thought, but the thought of them was not con-
nected to a feeling. By contrast, forms that have a certain indefiniteness, 
of the kind which stimulates the human imagination, which causes us 
to ask what they might be, are to be called beautiful. The joy one feels 
in contemplating them in their presence is, according to Kant, the joy in 
one’s own emotional activity, in the agitation and play of the emotions 
in their search for form.
For modern people, this view may well have something to recommend 
it. It does justice to the subjective element in the experience of beauty. It 
is not the – sober – noting of the perfection of a form which constitutes the 
experience of beauty, but rather the searching and tracing-out that a form 
induces. Kant was a man of the rococo; what were aesthetically relevant 
for him in the everyday world were its playful forms, the resonances 
and suggestions in a decor. The basic form, for this aesthetic, was not the 
sphere or the tetrahedron, but the seashell profile or, as in the graphic 
work of Hogarth, the unbalanced S-shape. The latter’s book The Analysis 
of Beauty11 contains a table of model drawings, including a line of beauty 
which corresponds approximately to the leg of a baroque chair or the 
corseted form of the upper part of a female body.
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It might be said that Kant brought beauty down from heaven to earth. 
If for Plato beautiful things are the eternal Forms, for Kant they are the 
objects of everyday life. There has been much dispute over whether 
Kant’s aesthetics is an aesthetics of art or of nature. But if one looks 
more closely one finds that the majority of his examples are taken from 
the field of design. He is interested in fashion, in tapestry; he speaks of 
front gardens and of table music.12 Aesthetic judgement is the ability 
to choose the right things with which to embellish life. Beauty has a 
community-forming function. In the pleasure taken in certain things, 
people with the same taste feel united. Through the furnishing of one’s 
surroundings one creates for oneself and others a stimulating, enliven-
ing atmosphere. That Kant still saw the reason for this primarily in the 
forms of objects may be a limitation; nevertheless, he liberated think-
ing about beauty from the domination of mathematics. Even when he is 
concerned with form, it is not consummate form, it is not perfection and 
precision, which today have succumbed beyond recall to the triviality of 
industrial production; rather, it is the degree of indefiniteness in form, 
the suggestive, the vague, the playful, which occasion the experience of 
beauty. In this, Kant points far beyond his own work.
3. New experiences
It is a bold assertion to state that people in different historical periods 
perceive in a different way. And yet modes of perception mediated by 
technology – in the visual sphere, since the invention of the telescope 
and the microscope – are likely to represent at least an enlargement of 
the field of perception and perhaps even fundamental changes.13 That 
will also have consequences for our conceptions of the beautiful. All the 
same, how one thinks about beauty is very fundamentally influenced 
by paradigmatic objects. No doubt we are far from asserting today that 
the human body is the paradigm par excellence of beauty, as Friedrich 
Schiller claimed and as was probably characteristic of German classi-
cism as a whole. Still more categorical, it seems, is the rejection of simple 
forms as paradigms of the beautiful. It is not only that simple geometri-
cal forms bore us – the glass pyramid in the courtyard of the Louvre was, 
after all, a mistake – but the simple yet sophisticated forms of a Brancusi 
or a Henry Moore, acclaimed half a century ago, now leave us cold. It 
seems that what was prefigured in Kant, the charm of the indefinite in 
form, has become autonomous as indeterminateness as such. One need 
only think of the fascination exerted by the seascapes of a photographer 
such as Hiroshi Sugimoto.
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Consider water: within the Kantian aesthetic – as in the classical aes-
thetic generally up to and including that of Adorno – it would have been 
unthinkable to derive aesthetic charm from water as such. Water is sim-
ply the formless, and for that very reason was seen by Aristotle – as 
that capable of being formed – as the antithesis of all form. A stream, a 
waterfall, a pond – such a thing is nowhere to be found in the Kantian 
aesthetic. It is true that he does mention the sea, but not under the head-
ing of beauty but of sublimity. The sea in its immeasurable vastness and 
its menacing violence is experienced, from a suitable distance, as sub-
lime. Of course, water or, more precisely, stretches of water, have often 
been present in landscape painting since its beginnings, but only as an 
ingredi ent, a component for generating a landscape-like atmosphere. In 
this capacity water was then explicitly appreciated by C. C. Hirschfeld 
in his theory of landscape gardening.14 He inquired into which type 
of body of water was suited to which natural scene, or more precisely, 
what a certain body of water contributed to the emotional character of 
a scene. From there it seems only a step to the paintings of Turner, who 
sought to paint atmospheres as products of the interplay of water, light 
and weather – in which interplay the world of objects receded entirely. 
Yet this was a large step, and it appears to have been taken by the wider 
public only a hundred years later.
All this was anticipated theoretically, of course, in Goethe’s theory of 
colours, which had ascribed to colours a sensuous and moral effect. To-
day we would speak of an atmospheric effect. Colours communicate to 
space a certain mood. And because this mood is apprehended by a per-
son present in terms of feeling, the interplay of colours in their vividness 
can be experienced as beauty. This effect, as far as it can be mediated 
by panel paintings, is experienced most clearly in the works of Mark 
Rothko.15 However, one should not contemplate them with the intention 
of ascertaining what can be seen in them; rather one should allow their 
colour effects to unfold spatially. If one starts out from the old antithesis 
of colour versus line, the paintings of Mark Rothko might be regarded as 
the new paradigm of beauty.
But, in this context, that does not take us very far. When a new idea 
of beauty is at issue we are concerned, of course, with the experience of 
light, water, space and colour as such, and with the pleasure of indefinite-
ness, of which Kant said that it stimulates the imagination. But it must 
be said first that it was new basic examples of beauty, new paradigms of 
perception, which prepared the way for this concept of beauty. And these 
have been mediated largely by the development of technology.
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This interconnection between technological development and the 
change in conceptions of beauty has two sides. On the one hand, the 
basic technical conditions of experience have made new perceptual 
pleasures available to people in the modern period. On the other, the 
technical mastery of light and sound, together with the technical shap-
ing of material or, still more, of materiality,16 have made possible the 
generation of practically unlimited aesthetic effects. The change in per-
ceptual experience may have begun with the microscope – less for the 
scientist, who saw something specific through it, than for the lay person, 
who gazed through the microscope into unknown worlds. In this context 
Ernst Haeckel’s radiolaria undoubtedly still belong to the old paradigms 
of beauty.17 By contrast, flickering forms at an indeterminate depth are 
something really new, especially when they appear in the fascinating 
illumination of polarised light. Closest to these are the experiences one 
has when diving, or through the mediation of underwater photography. 
Here again we find the indeterminateness, above all the floating sensa-
tion and the lighting, but most especially, in this case, the perception 
of the medium as well. It gives a sense of being present in a way which 
would never be possible in an object-determined world. Then there are 
the experiences of flying, which by now can be assumed to be shared by 
almost everyone. Here, one finds oneself in a space of flickering forms 
which change their appearance, depending on illumination and posi-
tion. The gaze stretches over infinite vistas with contours always unique, 
ephemeral. One encounters here not only a diffuse infinity but an almost 
surreal clarity of formations, with ungraspable contours. It is no wonder 
that clouds, which were always to be seen creating aerial perspectives in 
landscape paintings, should also, like water and light, have made them-
selves autonomous in art. It was no doubt Alfred Stieglitz who began 
this tendency about 1900, with pure cloud photography. This theme is 
ubiquitous today, and in Richter has been extended to panel painting.18 
Admittedly, in these object-fixing arts, much of the original aesthetic fas-
cination of clouds is lost. In a photograph they are easily reduced to a 
thing; with their mutability they also lose the charm they had for the 
imagination.19
What is crucial here is that such experiences can be assumed to be part 
of the general stock of experience. They belong to the normal spectrum 
of perception. For many people, further experiences, those of explicitly 
artificial worlds, can be added to this spectrum. One thinks of drug ex-
periences, in particular of LSD, an experience of weightlessness which is 
generated by this or other means, or experiences of computer games or 
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other virtual worlds. What matters here is whether a person is merely 
confronted with this world as an image, or experiences it as a space in 
which he or she is physically present. Only in the latter case can one 
speak of virtual worlds in the strict sense.20 But whether or not techni-
cal devices mediate these experiences in a particular case, they have an 
inherent tendency to abolish the division between dream and reality, a 
division by which the modern age was once defined.21 And precisely this 
appears to be the objective of postmodern pop aesthetics. It simulates 
worlds in which one is present in the form of an avatar: cave experiences 
in which one is present in simulated surroundings by means of data 
gloves and electronic spectacles. Or, inversely, it makes possible bodily 
presence in a simulated scene, like the one which can be experienced by 
a visitor to a casino in Las Vegas, who is catapulted by a lift into a scene 
from Star Trek.22 This is the point where we have to speak not only of 
new experiences, but of new needs.
4. New needs
It cannot be said that, in the light of these new experiences, the classical 
paradigms of beauty have been simply devalued. But we see them in a 
new way, we have new expectations of them; they practically have to 
prove themselves once again in experience. We would not be satisfied to 
know that they are perfect according to this or that criterion; we will ask 
what, or, better, whether we feel something in their presence. Experiences 
such as the Venus of Milo or Michelangelo’s David, Cologne cathedral, the 
Sforza Castle in Milan and the Alhambra in Granada would certainly 
pass this test. It is just that the spectrum has widened considerably, and 
we will describe as beautiful quite different things and scenes than were 
possible according to the classical aesthetic theories – a spider’s web glis-
tening with raindrops, a sun-steeped avenue of trees, but also the design 
of the illumination in an underground station or the sales display in a 
high-class departmental store. Today, beauty can no longer be banished 
to the museum, it is no longer defined by the difference between serious 
and popular art. In principle, we look for beauty everywhere. We can 
find beauty not only in art but also in advertising, in design, in urban 
scenes, in nature, and in the artificial worlds of our media. The only thing 
that counts is the quality of the impression emanating from a person, a 
scene, an object, a piece of architecture. What is decisive for us today, 
when we use the word beauty, is whether a person or a thing, a scene or 
a place makes us feel that we are there, whether these things, people or 
scenes contribute to intensifying our existence.
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This enables us to define once again, and in conclusion, the difference 
from classical notions of beauty. Plato, for good reasons, brought togeth-
er beauty and Eros. Eros, love, he thought, was the desire to possess the 
beautiful, and then, still more trenchantly, the desire always to possess 
the beautiful.23 Although we can still empathise with this idea, its weak-
nesses are undeniable: for if love is the desire to possess the beautiful, 
it will only remain alive for as long as one does not possess beauty, or 
for as long as its possession is at risk. What is more important, however, 
is the assumption contained in this relating of desire to the beautiful – 
that beauty as such is something lasting. And for Plato beauty is indeed 
ultimately an eternal Form, and is present in the sensuous world only in 
a highly fractured way. A corresponding assumption underlies the tradi-
tional striving of artists to create works, that is, something permanent. 
We, by contrast, have become more modest or, better, more sensuous. 
We are able to experience beauty in the ephemeral, the transient, in the 
light glinting on a pewter vessel24 or in the play of shadow on a white 
wall. Because we ourselves are transient beings, we encounter beauty in 
the lighting-up of appearances which assure us of our existence. Beauty 
is that which mediates to us the joy of being here.25
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